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~ Abstract ~ 
 
Scott’s Great Snake examines the extent to which coastal 
operations were crucial to the outcome of the American Civil War of 
1861-65. The focus falls on three key areas, blockade, land 
operations and international relations as they interacted with 
coastal war. Particular weight is given to the blockade as the main 
method of Union coastal warfare, to which the other two efforts 
related to a greater or lesser degree. Land actions served to 
reinforce the blockade while offering ambitious Northern officers the 
chance to directly influence events. Foreign relations were 
important to the North’s ability to continue to strangle its erstwhile 
members into submission due to the United States’ small stature 
next to the European imperial powers of the day, whose navies 
would have rendered coastal warfare impossible had they 
intervened. 
 
The cumulative effects of a strangling blockade reinforced and 
complimented by sympathetic land actions and the failure or 
success of the American belligerents’ foreign policy served to 
facilitate the weakening and eventual failure of the Confederate 
home and fighting fronts shaping the conditions in which the North’s 
land armies were able to triumph in 1865. 
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~ Scott’s Great Snake ~ 
 
‘Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!’1 In many way the possibly 
apocryphal words of Admiral David Glasgow Farragut upon seeing 
the ironclad monitor Tecumseh disappear beneath the waves in two 
minutes after hitting a mine in the opening phase of the Battle of 
Mobile Bay, sum up the attitude of many to naval, and especially 
coastal, operations in the American Civil War. The words are 
picturesque, Farragut was a picturesque man. He was a formidable 
Admiral, a veteran of fifty years in the United States Navy. When he 
gave his famous order he supposedly was lashed to the rigging of 
his flagship, Hartford, having refused the pleas of his officers to 
descend to the deck, lest he fall and be killed. This only serves to 
add a further level of novelty and martial splendour to the occasion, 
yet what the throwaway quote ultimately represents more than 
anything is the low esteem in which the naval dimension is held in 
many studies of the wider conflict.  
 
In general, Mobile Bay is one of a small number of coastal battles, 
along with the fight between the Monitor and the Merrimac/Virginia 
in Hampton Roads, New Orleans and perhaps the bombardment of 
Fort Pulaski, Tennessee, which have intruded, if they have intruded 
at all, into the popular study of the War Between the States. Far 
                                                 
1 Hearn, Chester G. Admiral David Glasgow Farragut The Civil War Years 
(Annapolis, Md. Naval Institute Press, 1998) pp262-3 
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more storied in naval terms are the exploits of the Confederate 
raiders, the Florida, Shenandoah and especially the Alabama. These 
picturesque ships were commanded by picturesque captains and 
fought a picturesque war largely free from the blood and carnage of 
Fredericksburg, Shiloh or Antietam, or the boredom of the blockade. 
For all this the actions of the famed Confederate raiders, vexatious 
as they were to the North and especially its commerce, ultimately 
influenced the outcome of the War only in a somewhat peripheral 
sense.2 Perhaps the weight given to the Southern cruisers is 
because glorious sea battles and picturesque ships, were 
comparatively rare and thus they have become famous as discrete 
incidents, notable enough for mention in their own right, but wholly 
disconnected from the larger campaigns of which they formed a 
part. The way in which War’s land campaigns, especially the 
glorious Eastern battles, have monopolised scholarship has served 
to marginalise the significance of naval warfare to the final outcome 
of the conflict. The wealth of sources available on the land 
dimension provides valuable context for a naval study, as well as 
information on its broader effects. But conclusions must be drawn 
by piecing together details from many smaller and more specific 
works. Foreign policy too, despite its importance to the North’s 
victory has also existed on the fringes of mainstream study. 
Domestic politics are usually more popular subject, especially in 
                                                 
2 Konstam, Angus Confederate Raider 1861-65 (Oxford, Osprey 2003) p4 
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terms of their role in the origins of the War, Abraham Lincoln’s 
emancipation policies and his 1864 election victory; studies of which 
again usually attribute only peripheral importance to naval or 
coastal warfare. 
 
In many ways this can be attributed to the fact that the greatest 
part played by the US Navy in attacking the Confederacy was not 
upon the high seas in naval actions contested in the best traditions 
of daring and glory à la Nelson (or in a more distinctly American 
context) Decatur or John Paul Jones. It was along the southern 
coastline from Virginia to Texas that the greater part of the naval 
war took place. This coastal dimension remains unglamorous. The 
preponderance of coastal operations, constituting the most 
muscular coils of the titular serpent, consisted of blockade, by far 
the most significant, and often most ignored, of the Union’s 
seaborne efforts to win the war. Blockade was the earliest identified 
and most resource intensive method employed by the North against 
the Confederacy, as such much of what the North did in naval terms 
was directly or indirectly connected with maintaining its choking 
effect. As a subject blockade can be dull, especially when its 
importance is only peripherally acknowledged. Enjoying a similar 
tendency to dreariness are the efforts made by the North in 
international diplomacy in order that the Union could continue to 
conduct its strangling campaign unmolested. This is in itself odd, 
 12 
since the sphere of both Northern and Southern diplomacy contains 
at least as many picturesque characters as does the military effort. 
The sphere of Civil War international politics includes the likes of 
William H. Seward, Lincoln’s secretary of state, a man prone to 
alcohol-induced, vituperative rhetoric against Britain. Then there 
are the Confederate commissioners, among them William Lowndes 
Yancey (who desired a resumption of the African slave trade) and 
John Slidell, a man of whom it was said that if locked in a cell (as he 
would find himself in 1861) he ‘would conspire with the mice 
against the cat.’3 The Civil war’s international diplomacy was vital to 
the continuance of the North’s coastal war against the South yet 
even in the event that the importance of the latter has been 
acknowledged, the diplomatic aspect has still found itself treated in 
discrete terms much as have the individual engagements in all but a 
small number of works. The ‘Trent Affair,’ though an undeniably 
important crisis point in Union-British foreign relations, is often the 
only major penetration of the political sphere into the study of the 
Civil War and its naval dimension. Overemphasis of this ignores the 
more mundane, yet equally important, moves by the North to 
ensure the maintenance of provisions such as the Foreign 
Enlistment Act in Britain, and to prevent the appearance of 
Confederate warships powerful enough to challenge the US Navy’s 
presence off the Southern coast which blockade, and the paucity of 
                                                 
3 Foote, Shelby The Civil War, a Narrative Vol 1. – Fort Sumter to Perryville (New 
York, Random House 1958) p138 
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resources, rendered it impossible for the South to construct 
domestically. 
 
The coastal war, through the medium of blockade placed the North 
in almost constant close proximity to the Confederate coastline. In 
such an environment it is understandable that commanders would 
eventually take their prosecution of the war beyond the bounds of 
the shore, or that generals operating inland would wish to push to 
the limits dry shoes would allow. Again the aspect of the war 
beyond the beach had tangible effects on the South’s ability to 
continue the fight which were perhaps more immediate and obvious 
than the blockade. The capture of ports on the Confederate coast 
was the primary means by which the North could ensure, aside from 
cutting off supplies of materiel via blockade, that the South could 
not domestically produce vessels with the power to chase Union 
shipping from the shore and lift the blockade, as they had 
threatened to do with the Merrimac/Virginia4  
 
Not only did operations along the coast serve to reinforce the 
blockade’s strangulation of the Confederacy, it also served to offer 
opportunities for the North to prosecute the war aggressively into 
areas they would not normally have access to, which were thus 
lightly defended and where even the smallest of attacks would have 
                                                 
4 Konstam, Angus Confederate Ironclad 1861-65 (Oxford, Osprey 2001) p3 
 14 
a quantifiable effect on Confederate morale and public opinion. 
Ultimately, the seizure by land or amphibious action of points on the 
Confederate shore extended the coastal war to all aspects of life for 
Southerners. While the question as to whether the Civil War was the 
‘first modern war’ is moot, the targeting of the home front as well 
as the fighting front suggests elements of a later warfare. Southern 
civilians and especially their leaders, dependent as the South was 
on relative harmony reigning between its various States so that it 
could conduct the defence of its territory as effectively as possible, 
were a significant part of the Confederate war effort. Because the 
blockade enjoyed priority of resourcing in the North, extension of 
the campaign inland did not incur additional expense. This 
represented a natural and effective extension of the Union’s war 
strategy, and had a significant effect on the outcome via its 
influence on Southern politics. The discord and infighting was 
symbolised by the actions of Joe Brown, governor of Georgia, who 
by 1865 was advocating the dissolution of the Confederacy5 - in 
effect the mutual secession of the Southern states. Political 
infighting brought about by coastal warfare eroded support for the 
central authority and represented a significant blow to Southern 
morale which proved fatal when combined with the massive 
casualty lists coming in from Northern Virginia, Tennessee and 
Georgia. 
                                                 
5 Foote, Shelby The Civil War, a Narrative Vol. 3 – Red River to Appomattox (New 
York, Random House 1974) p93 
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In examining the coastal war, the focus will be on three key areas in 
which these operations intersected most significantly with the 
conduct of the broader Civil War, and thus its outcome. The first 
topic for analysis will be the blockade, since it represented the 
primary focus of the North’s coastal war effort, identified as the 
conflict began, and continuing for the entirety of the War. It was 
also a fundamental way in which the Union could keep up pressure 
on the South, and was not dependant on the variable fortunes of 
the North’s field armies.  
 
The second focus will be operations conducted on land either 
amphibiously or by armies moving from the hinterland to the coast. 
Land operations allowed the North to influence the outcome of the 
war more directly than was possible through blockade. The 
corrosive effects of supply shortages brought about by blockade 
might eventually weaken the Confederacy sufficiently that it would 
be unable to continue its resistance, but by taking the war inland 
more immediate results could be achieved. These gains could be 
expanded even further if the Union were to continue its coastal 
drive into the interior where, operating in the Confederate rear, 
serious damage could be done to the Southern war effort.  
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Finally, the analysis will shift to the political sphere. International 
relations were massively significant to the outcome of the war in a 
world where the United States was a small power with strictly 
limited influence. The position of ‘Brother Jonathan’ as the famous 
British satirical publication Punch personified the United States,6 
was summed up in Lord Palmerston’s comment that the way to deal 
with Americans was to be ‘very civil, very firm, and to go our own 
way’7 The United States’ low international standing meant that the 
attitudes of the European Great Powers would potentially decide the 
outcome of hostilities if they resolved to fall in behind one or the 
other of the American belligerents. Even if the European powers 
were not to become actively engaged in the war, their failure to 
observe strict neutrality would open them up as potential tacit 
supporters for whichever combatant was able to woo them. This 
was an especially attractive prospect for the South, and applied 
significantly to the coastal war inasmuch as the North’s blockading 
attempts would not be helped by European assistance offered to the 
Confederacy in procuring or shipping contraband goods into the 
South. Its attractiveness was further enhanced for Confederate 
leaders by the fact that it was their belief that the South’s primary 
cash product, cotton, represented a powerful edge in the form of a 
bargaining token for use in bending the trans-Atlantic powers to 
                                                 
6 Foreman Amanda A World on Fire: An Epic History of Two Nations Divided 
(London Allen Lane 2010) p198 
7 Ibid p19 
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their will. Potentially, foreign relations could derail the North’s 
coastal effort if Southern moves were not countered by active Union 
diplomacy. 
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~ 1. ~  
~ From the Chesapeake to the Mississippi …and Beyond – 
Blockade and Blockade Running ~ 
 
As the title of this work suggests, the Federal blockade represents 
most obviously the connection between coastal warfare and the 
titular snake, its muscular coils paralysing and then steadily 
constricting the South until it weakened and died. If this analogy 
holds true, then the importance to the outcome of the blockade, 
and coastal warfare in general will become evident. Blockade was 
without doubt the single most visible and significant thrust of Union 
efforts to subdue the South along its coastline during the American 
Civil War. The blockade involved a majority of the United States 
Navy and consumed the talents of its best officers. Such was the 
importance attached to the blockade, a committee was set up at the 
Navy department in Washington with the remit of identifying targets 
for blockading action. The group was then charged with facilitating 
the effective establishment of a naval cordon around those areas.1 
Blockade was the first means by which the North sought to combat 
the South by sea and it was from the desire to achieve an effective 
blockade that other efforts, comprising measures taken to dissuade 
foreign states from illicitly aiding the Confederacy, and the 
mounting of amphibious or land based activities along the South’s 
                                                 
1 Dougherty, Kevin Strangling the Confederacy: Coastal Operations in the 
American Civil War (London, Casemate 2010) p32 
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sea-coast, sprang. The importance of blockade, in terms of the 
significance the North attached to implementing it, is shown 
particularly tellingly by the resources which were devoted to it. 
 
The high value placed on the blockade by the Northern authorities 
stemmed from the fact that the South, a nation of nine million, of 
whom more than three million were slaves,2 would not be able to 
‘survive without its imports’3 in opposition to the North’s twenty-two 
million. Before discussing the material shortages brought about by 
blockade it is worth noting that the North’s population was not only 
superior to that of the South but, was ever growing due to 
immigration, especially from Ireland and central Europe. 
Approximately 200,000 ‘Dutch’ and 150,000 Irish  served in the 
Union armies4 but the South was denied access to these manpower 
sources because immigration was cut off by blockade. Thus The 
North’s population advantage was increased by access to outside 
sources and the capacity for it to replace casualties significantly 
increased. The South by contrast, had to service demands of the 
battlefield on its manpower mainly by drawing on a shrinking 
population which the Confederacy had no way of ‘topping up’ with 
mass immigration.   
 
                                                 
2 Foote, Shelby The Civil War, Vol.1 pp60-61 
3 Foreman A World on Fire p743 
4 Davis, William C. The Civil War: A Historical Account of America’s War of 
Secession (New York, Smithmark 1996) pp366-7 
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Despite accusations that Southerners with positions of influence in 
government and the military had deliberately transferred war 
materials and supplies to positions in the South where they would 
be captured in the event of secession, the newborn Confederacy 
was according to James Bulloch ‘distressingly deficient in all field 
necessities,’5 with rifles being in critically short supply. Bulloch, a 
confederate purchasing agent sent to Britain by the Navy 
Department to secure ships and arms for the Confederacy, himself 
made a November 1861 run through the blockade with 10,000 
British Enfield rifle-muskets, this consignment alone was equal to 
one half of the total number of modern firearms extant in the South 
on the outbreak of war. Due to the shortage, many soldiers had to 
make do with antiquated smoothbore or flintlock weapons6 which 
were not only inaccurate but were affected by weather conditions to 
the extent that a Confederate unit at the Battle of Mill Springs found 
its weapons unusable due to a sudden rain storm.7  
 
Artillery would prove to be a key factor in many Civil war battles. 
Massive infantry assaults at Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg, Franklin 
and most importantly, Gettysburg, were halted largely through the 
                                                 
5 Bulloch, James, D. Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe or, How 
the Confederate Cruisers were Equipped (New York, Random House 2001) p78 
6 Drury, Ian Confederate Infantryman 1861-65 (Oxford, Osprey 1993) pp11-12 
7 Ibid  
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effective use of artillery firing canister at short ranges.8 However, 
there was very little artillery in the South; again modern pieces 
were at the greatest premium on the outbreak of war. More 
significantly in terms of the coastal war the lack of artillery meant 
that fortifications, a core feature of the Confederacy’s strategy for 
defending not only its littoral, but also its inland waterways, were 
often short of guns. The numerical disadvantage was one issue, but 
a more serious problem was that modern rifled guns could breach 
the hitherto impregnable fortifications on which the South placed 
such importance, and which were so crucial to the maintenance of 
outside trade. In order that the forts did not become ‘obsolete white 
elephants’9 they would have themselves to be armed with modern 
long ranged and accurate rifled artillery. 
 
The South’s inferior manufacturing capacity, centred in a handful of 
the Confederacy’s largest cities, could not hope to match the 
demand for arms created by the requirement of putting armies of 
tens of thousands into the field for extended periods. Thus the 
Confederates would have to import large numbers of weapons to 
supply their armies and, due to the numerical superiority of the 
North, the most modern and effective weapons would be needed so 
that the south’s quantitative disadvantage was not compounded by 
                                                 
8 Griffith, Paddy Battle Tactics of the American Civil War (Ramsbury, Crowood 
2001) pp167-8 
9 Konstam, Angus American Civil War Fortifications (1) Coastal Brick and Stone 
Forts (Oxford, Osprey 2003) 
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a qualitative one. Realistically, only the manufacturing power of 
France, and especially Britain, was sufficient to produce the number 
and quality of weapons needed by the Confederacy. According to 
Paddy Griffith the Confederates acquired an approximate total of 
340,000 small-arms in Europe during the War, as against 107,000 
produced domestically.10  
 
Furthermore, in addition to lacking any kind of military Navy, the 
South had no significant civilian fleet. Before the War the South had 
relied on foreign or Northern vessels for transatlantic runs, most 
Southern shipping being coastal or riverine in nature.11 With 
northern bottoms denied them, only the European states, again 
Britain in particular, had the merchant shipping requisite to the task 
of transporting materials in the required volumes to the South.12 
This would of course depend on the ability of the Confederacy to 
keep its ports open, and conversely on the success achieved by the 
North in closing them down. The main way by which the North 
sought to achieve this was through blockade.  
 
Obviously shortages of weapons, especially rifles and artillery 
presented a significant challenge to the South’s ability to win the 
war and consequently impinged upon the conflict’s outcome. As 
                                                 
10 Griffith Paddy Battle Tactics p80 
11 Konstam, Angus Confederate Blockade Runner 1861-65 (Oxford, Osprey 2004) 
p7 
12 Ibid 
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long as the Confederates continued to have access, even to reduced 
quantities, of modern weapons they could still, at the very 
minimum, protract the war. Additionally the North had also to pour 
resources into a blockade which, though the Union had far greater 
reserves upon which to call than did the South, were not limitless; 
at least in the first two or so years of the conflict. Focus on the 
blockade was one of the reasons why Union river fleets, especially 
in the strategically vital Mississippi river theatre, were so short of 
trained sailors and suitable armaments. The blockading fleet took 
priority to the extent that other waterborne efforts had to make do 
with press-ganged soldiers and antiquated artillery. Several guns 
intercepted before being fitted to Union warships out West were 
discovered to have come from a batch rejected as faulty and 
dangerous in the 1840s,13 while the Union river Ironclad USS 
Carondelet was forced to break off action at the battle of Fort 
Donelson when a defective gun blew up after repeated firing during 
that engagement.14 If the blockade was not working, while still 
absorbing resources which could be put to better use elsewhere it 
was hampering the Union’s war effort and prolonging the struggle. 
 
Shortages brought about by blockade that affected the army 
represented a serious threat to the survival of the Confederate 
                                                 
13 Tucker, Spencer C. Andrew Foote, Civil War Admiral on Western Waters 
(Annapolis MD. Naval Institute Press 2000) p119 
14 Konstam, Angus Union River Ironclad 1861-65 (Oxford Osprey 2002) p22 
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nation due to its inability to defend itself. However the impact of the 
blockade also targeted the South on the home front. Away from the 
battlefield the Confederacy would also have to look overseas in 
order to feed its civilian population. The land area covered by the 
south was larger than that of the North. The South’s trans-
Mississippi region offered significant sources of food and provisions 
but the South’s poor transport links, comprising few good quality 
roads and a limited railroad network prone to breakdowns and 
delay, meant that provisions secured in the trans-Mississippi were 
difficult to transport the long distances to feed both soldiers and 
civilians further to the East.15 Ultimately with the fall of Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson to the Union in 1863 the potential of this large 
region was lost to the remainder of the Confederacy. This in itself is 
of note from a coastal perspective since, although the victories 
which allowed the river to go ‘once more unvexed to the sea’16 
occurred inland, the campaign began with the opening of the mouth 
of the river when New Orleans, with all its manufacturing potential, 
was lost to the South in 1862. 
 
The loss of the trans-Mississippi meant an even greater reliance on 
the agriculture of the East, especially the fertile Shenandoah Valley; 
long the breadbasket of the South. Production there was still 
                                                 
15 Foote, The Civil War Vol.1  p60 
16 Foote, Shelby The Civil War, a Narrative Vol. 2 – Fredericksburg to Meridian 
(New York, Random House 1963) p640 
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insufficient though, owing to the progressive effects of war on the 
land, culminating in the direct targeting of the Valley by the North 
in 1864. Sheridan’s campaign, aimed squarely at leaving the 
Confederate civilians with nothing but ‘their eyes to weep with over 
the War,’17 devastated land which had become progressively less 
and less suitable for the raising of crops or livestock.18 Furthermore, 
the agricultural workforce suffered heavy depletion, in the form of 
the drafting of men into the army, some 60 per cent of confederate 
infantrymen were farm workers.19 Combined with battlefield losses, 
this left behind an inadequate workforce of women, elderly men and 
slaves (who were themselves dependents.) They could not hope to 
service the supply wants of the army while also supporting 
themselves, despite the fact that as an agrarian people their self 
sufficiency was perhaps greater than their Northern opponents.20 By 
1863 food riots were breaking out, with Jefferson Davis himself 
becoming involved in an incident in Richmond wherein he was 
forced to threaten that the militia would open fire on a crowd 
composed mostly of women unless it dispersed.21 Taken in 
combination with the requirement of supporting massive armies 
who had to be supplied in the field without returning to assist in 
production, the food shortages incurred through blockade targeted 
                                                 
17 Foreman, A World on Fire pp697-7 
18 Ibid 
19 Drury, Confederate Infantryman p6 
20 Coombe, Jack D. Gunfire Around the Gulf?: The Last Major Naval Campaigns of 
the Civil War (London, Bantam 2000) p2 
21 Foote, The Civil War Vol. 2 p163-4 
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the army’s ability to defend a civilian population whose own 
capacity for resistance was being undermined.  
 
Therefore, supply problems affected the process of fighting the War 
in two ways. Firstly they deprived the Southern armies of sufficient 
provisions; food to eat, clothes to wear and weapons with which to 
fight. The result was that their fighting efficiency was reduced 
versus Northern troops who had access to superior quantities of 
good quality victuals. Secondly the lack of essentials, especially 
food, endangered the stability of the Confederate home front and its 
ability to support the fighting men. Unrest amongst the civilian 
population exacerbated structural problems in a Confederacy which, 
as its name suggests was, and had to remain, a loose association of 
states. Moves towards centralisation, such as conscription, were 
desirable to assist the prosecution of the war. But not only were 
they deeply unpopular they undermined the very raison d’être of 
the Confederate States because such moves had been one of the 
key motivations for fire-eating Southern secessionists in the run up 
to the Civil War.22 The sufferings of Confederate civilians back home 
also sapped the morale of the Confederate armies, with many 
desertions in the latter part of the war being traced to the twin 
causes of a lack of food at the front combined with a lack of food at 
home. Piteous letters were sent by the families of Confederate 
                                                 
22 Foote, The Civil War Vol. 1 p395 
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soldiers begging them to desert and so support their dependants. 
‘No wonder men become indifferent to which side shall prevail’ 
wrote Confederate War department clerk James Jones in 1864.23 
 
For the North, effective Blockade also represented in itself one of 
the main ways by which the USN could ensure that its strangling 
action was not seriously challenged. On the outbreak of war, the 
South’s naval forces consisted of a few captured US revenue cutters 
of dubious utility and some big plans in the heads of certain 
individuals.24 The South’s low level of industrialisation meant that 
even had the supply situation been better, it was unlikely that the 
Confederate States Navy could have been built up to a size in 
regular ships capable of challenging the USN’s dominance, and even 
if it had, it would have been extremely difficult to get them to sea.25 
Therefore, the Southerners would have to look to innovation to 
produce weapons which were superior in technical terms and thus 
could act as force multipliers. The South soon turned to ironclad 
vessels which represented a technological development sufficient to 
give the Confederates a useful edge in combat with their 
counterparts in the Union blockading squadrons. The chief drawback 
of ironclads however, was that their construction required materials 
and facilities not readily available in the South, chiefly iron plate, 
                                                 
23 Foreman, A World on Fire p697 
24 Symonds, Craig L. Confederate Admiral, the Life and Wars of Franklin 
Buchanan (Annapolis, Md. Naval Institute Press 1999) p149 
25 Bulloch, The Secret Service p18 
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heavy artillery and powerful marine steam engines with the 
factories to roll, cast and manufacture them.26 By increasing the 
effectiveness of the blockade the Union could limit the amount of 
these hard to come by materials which could be brought in from 
overseas with the result that they rendered their own position more 
secure. Southern engineers and constructors managed to pull 
together the iron and ordnance needed to construct a number of 
ironclads despite being unable to bring much of the materials 
through the blockade. The construction of the CSS Albemarle in a 
cornfield alongside the Roanoke River, and the conversion of the 
blockade runner Fingal into the ironclad Atlanta, illustrates the fact 
that the South could continue to build some ironclads without 
outside input. Yet the Albemarle was not a seagoing vessel and thus 
its utility against the blockade was limited,27 while the Atlanta was 
of inferior construction and was no match for the Northern monitor 
Weehawken.28 Material shortages always hampered Confederate 
efforts to acquire domestically built ironclads. The chief sticking 
point when designing vessels large and versatile enough to directly 
challenge the blockading squadrons in blue water naval actions, was 
always motive power. The South simply did not possess the 
capacity to build engines of the size and power necessary to give 
the ironclads they constructed, some of which were very effective 
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designs, the driving force to take full advantage of their attributes 
in terms of firepower and armoured protection. As James Bulloch 
noted, on the outbreak of war the South possessed only one factory 
capable of manufacturing marine steam engines.29 The lack of 
proper propulsion hampered almost universally the effectiveness of 
Confederate ironclads committed to combat during the War.30 In 
consequence, these ships chances of defending the Confederacy’s 
ports was significantly reduced and plans to take the fight to the 
Union Navy by emerging from anchorages such as Mobile and New 
Orleans to force the lifting of the blockade had to be abandoned 
because the Southern ironclads were too underpowered to survive 
the open seas. 
 
Though the prospects for the South looked increasingly grim, as 
long as North failed to make the blockade truly airtight, the South 
was still able to bring in outside food supplies, albeit in reduced 
quantities.31 This influenced the War’s outcome, since as long as 
ships carrying goods for the South could still dock in Confederate 
ports their cargoes could bolster or replace the agricultural capacity 
lost by the South, and support the Confederacy’s field armies. This 
then staved off the date at which Northern efforts would succeed in 
starving the Confederacy to the point of the collapse of its armies 
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and it home front, and the end of the Confederacy’s capacity to 
actively resist. The main means of bringing goods into the 
Confederacy in spite of Northern strangling efforts was through 
blockade running. There were a multitude of people willing to 
engage in this illegal and potentially risky practice. British sailors, 
especially, enthusiastically embraced blockade running as a 
lucrative and, in the early days comparatively easy way of earning a 
living.32 Blockade running was so profitable precisely because the 
South was incapable of self-sufficiency and would thus pay inflated 
prices for essentials. Complimenting this was that fact that the 
South possessed a product which was as desired in Britain and 
Europe as much as weapons were wanted in the Confederacy. 
Cotton was one of the very few things that the South excelled at 
producing, and could continue to produce in quantities sufficient to 
impact the outcome of the war once hostilities had commenced. 
Initial Southern hopes surrounding the use of cotton as a bargaining 
chip in international diplomacy proved to be optimistic. Jefferson 
Davis was in particular was guilty of assuming an automatic 
relationship between cotton and foreign intervention.33 However, 
the fibre still had a more basic use as currency in transactions with 
overseas traders willing to break the law to ship goods into the 
Confederacy. Such traders knew that they would get a good price in 
cotton for their wares and they could then convert the cotton into 
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cash once back in Europe where a ‘cotton famine’ meant that there 
were plenty of people willing to buy at high prices with few 
questions as to its origin.34 The use of cotton as currency also 
handily circumvented the fact that the South was cash poor and 
lacked gold reserves, meaning that no matter what measures the 
North took to place financial pressure on the South, the 
Confederacy always had reserves of a desirable raw material on 
which to draw for overseas purchases. In addition, blockade running 
represented a challenge to the integrity of the blockade in legal 
terms. According to the declaration of Paris, a document the Union 
came increasingly to regret having failed to sign, a blockade would 
only be regarded as legal if it was ‘effective,’ which is to say it was 
actually capable of excluding trade from blockaded ports.35 The 
declaration was ostensibly designed to prevent the frivolous 
declaration of ‘paper blockades,’ as well as establishing international 
norms for commerce warfare and abolishing privateering. In 
refusing to sign, the Americans had argued that the declaration was 
cynical, since it discriminated against small states wont to use, as 
the US had, privateers, but who lacked the naval strength sufficient 
to establish tight blockades. At the same time, it benefitted 
signatories such as Britain whose massive merchant marine would 
be less at risk of exclusion by foreign blockades, and whose huge 
navy could easily enforce, and thus legalize, its own blockading 
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actions.36 As long as large numbers of ships were able to continue 
to run through the blockade, as they were early in the war, the 
‘effectiveness’ of the North’s blockade could be called into question 
in terms of international agreements to which European powers 
being courted by the Confederacy were party. 
 
In some areas the presence of numerous barrier islands that the 
South could not hope to garrison all of frustrated Confederate 
moves against the blockade. However, these conditions served with 
other factors broadly to assist blockade runners. Much of the 
Confederacy’s seaboard featured numerous channels and entrances 
into the rivers and bays on which key port Cities such as Mobile, 
Wilmington, Charleston and New Orleans were situated. Union 
vessels would have to patrol all the entrances and exits in order to 
close off these supply lines. The uncomfortable truth from a Union 
perspective, was that the number of inlets and outlets, combined 
with the ready availability of knowledgeable and skilled pilots, 
meant that it was impossible to ensure that no ship got past the 
blockade.37  
 
The fact that many of the Confederate seaports were located on 
rivers also contributed to the difficulty faced by the Union in sealing 
them, especially by preventing them from establishing a close or 
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‘inner’ blockade. The fortified waterways, defended by formidable 
works such as Wilmington’s Fort Fisher, were combined with 
innovative defensive measures such as torpedoes (mines in the 
modern sense,) to prevent Union ships keeping a close watch for 
blockade runners departing or approaching the quay.38 
Consequently the blockade line had to be maintained further out, 
beyond the range of fortifications, torpedoes and natural hazards 
such as rocks and shoals, hoping to catch the blockade runners as 
they emerged or to spot them in the vastness of the Atlantic or Gulf 
as they approached. This was made more difficult as the blockaders 
were dealing with ships which did not want to be discovered and 
would take steps such as moving in only at night, employing low 
visibility paint schemes, removing or shortening masts and funnels 
and burning smokeless coal to prevent fumes from being observed 
by watching Union ships.39 However, if the Union was able to 
intercept and capture a blockade runner, not only would its cargo be 
lost, but it was possible to press the vessel into Northern service for 
use against further attempts to breach the blockade. One such 
‘turned’ vessel went on to capture five other blockade runners in its 
role as a Union ‘chaser.’40 This illustrates another way in which the 
Northern blockade could be self reinforcing. 
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Therefore, despite the fact that blockade was the most effective 
way of indirectly bringing about victory, it could not alone ensure 
the collapse of the Confederates’ resistance capacity. As long as the 
ports were in Southern hands, even if blockaded, the massively 
increased Union Navy could not hope to watch and guard every 
inlet, cove, bay and passage by which blockade runners might seek 
to carry their cargoes to Southern ports. To shut off the supply 
entirely, and make the blockade a hermetic one, the ports 
themselves would have to fall into Union hands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
~ 2. ~ 
‘Within gunshot of salt water,’ Coastal Land Operations 
 
While some Confederate ports remained in Southern hands, they 
would continue to serve as hubs for the illicit trade conducted by 
blockade runners. At the very least this would maintain the capacity 
of the Confederacy to continue the fight. Also morale on the home 
front could be bolstered by the continuing arrival of blockade 
running ships, and foreign powers could not be entirely persuaded 
by the North that the Union was capable of ending the ‘rebellion’ in 
the Southern states. Consequently closing those ports conclusively, 
and for good, would have to be conducted by movements on land. 
In some cases geography allowed this to be done purely by sea, but 
this was not always possible and the closing of a port did not 
remove the entire worth of the City to the Confederate war effort. 
 
Firstly sustaining the blockade in such a way as to strangle the 
South would require some land operations to be undertaken due to 
the length of the Confederate coastline to be watched and guarded. 
One of the members of the Blockade Board set up at the beginning 
of the war to oversee the North’s strategy was Samuel F. Du Pont, 
an experienced and respected regular US navy officer. Du Pont had 
seen considerable service attempting to enforce a blockade of 
Mexico during the United States’ war with that South American 
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nation in the 1840s. The American blockade of Mexico had been 
notoriously ineffective and Du Pont traced this in large part to the 
distance between the main American naval bases, and the shores of 
Mexico. Most of the United States’ bases were on the East Coast, 
with the main exceptions of New Orleans on the Gulf, and San 
Francisco on the Pacific.1 The lack of intervening bases meant that 
blockading vessels had to travel long distances to refit. Were they 
not to have constantly to return to US ports, provisions would have 
to be brought out to them, risking interception by Mexican cruisers 
targeting American commerce.2 This situation would have been 
inconvenient even for a large navy, which the USN of that day was 
not, and the complications caused by distance from repair and 
supply facilities exposed the limitations of the American fleet 
mercilessly. 
 
Thus, in order that the American blockaders of 1861 did not suffer 
the same problems leading to a similarly ineffective blockade of the 
South, impinging upon that blockade’s bearing on the outcome of 
the war, Du Pont recommended the seizing of strategic points along 
the Southern coast as bases for the blockading squadrons.3 This 
capitalised on the South’s lack of a navy and removed one of the 
key barriers to an effective blockade. In particular the retaking of 
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Norfolk, with the old USN base at Gosport, and Ship Island on the 
Gulf, gave the Union convenient and secure facilities to victual and 
repair their blockading vessels.4 The most immediate and simplest 
result was that more ships could stay on the blockade line for 
longer, tightening the seal on the South’s commerce. Soon 
however, the Union became more expansive and the blockading 
bases they had seized early in the war became jumping off points 
for operations such as the capture of New Orleans which, by 
opening the mouth of the Mississippi to Union attack and eliminating 
a major manufacturing centre, was one of the War’s most far 
reaching and important victories.   
 
Some ports could be closed down by occupying key points of land at 
the entrances to bays or rivers on which they were situated. In 
these instances the need for a large scale land campaign and 
occupation was mitigated by the fact that nothing could enter or 
exit the Confederate port once a strategic island or peninsula was 
seized. In this way the Union sealed off the port of Savannah, 
Georgia by capturing Fort Pulaski, a substantial brick and stone 
fortification located on Cockspur Island, in the middle of the channel 
leading from the city to the open Ocean.5 The city of Savannah did 
not fall until December of 1864, but was unable to trade with the 
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outside world, and thus bring in resources needed by the South to 
continue the war, after the fall of the fort in 1862. 
 
In other cases the total sealing of port cities, and thus the final 
closing off of the supply routes they represented, required the 
capture of the City itself. This could not be achieved by sea forces 
alone even if the navy did play a part in the operations. New 
Orleans was largely secured for the North by a naval action at the 
two forts below the City but it had then to be occupied by a land 
force. The occupation of port cities was needed not only to prevent 
them from trading with the outside, but because they represented 
significant centres of manufacturing and industry. New Orleans was 
the most obvious example of this, as the Confederacy’s largest city 
it possessed a huge number of factories producing military and 
civilian essentials and weapons in addition to its huge sea 
commerce.6 It was not, however, alone in being a key production 
centre, Charleston and New Bern as well as Wilmington also 
contained significant industry as indeed did most ports due to the 
association of industry with trade. ‘Placing a cork in the bottle’7 as 
Shelby Foot put it, of some Confederate port cities such as 
Savannah did contribute significantly to the blockade by preventing 
ships from trading with those ports. But the cities themselves 
remained valuable to the South as industrial centres which could 
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still distribute their wares internally to support the Southern war 
effort. 
 
Consequently, the land operations supported the blockade by 
ensuring that the South’s seaports could neither trade with the 
outside world nor serve as centres of internal supply. The disruption 
and loss of industrial capacity hurt the South, which was already 
short of industry, and further reinforced the strangling effect of the 
blockade by increasing the number of essential items the 
Confederacy could not produce itself and which would have to be 
procured from the outside world.  
 
In addition to supporting the blockade, land operations which 
formed part of the coastal war provided an opportunity for the 
Union to extend their impact into the Confederate interior and thus 
weaken the South for blows to be struck by the North’s main field 
armies. Projecting power through coastal operations was an 
attractive notion as far as Northern commanders were concerned 
since for a comparatively small investment of men and ships the 
potential presented itself for simplifying the job of Union armies 
which were prone to halting advances that, especially in the East, 
often stalled before going swiftly into reverse. One of the most 
forward looking exponents of the concept was Ambrose Burnside, 
who originated the concepts of a ‘Coastal Division’ made up of 
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seafaring men from New England regiments who would be trained in 
amphibious warfare and used as a striking force up and down the 
Confederate coast.8 This force was used in the ‘Burnside Expedition’ 
by which Roanoke Island and New Bern were captured. Making use 
of footholds gained on the Confederate coastline also held the 
attraction of providing a way of outflanking the Southern armies. 
George McLellan was one general who appreciated this, conceiving 
the so called ‘Urbanna Plan’ which eventually morphed into the 
Peninsula Campaign of 1862. The prospects for the offensive were 
initially positive, and the operation may well have resulted in a war 
winning advantage for the North. McLellan’s force enjoyed an 
advantage of anywhere from 3:1 to 10:1 over their opponents.9 
However, the general’s bungling timidity ultimately squandered the 
surprise achieved by the initial Union sea advance, and the 
opportunity was lost.  
 
Moving to the Gulf, the capture of New Orleans has already been 
mentioned, as has its contribution to the reinforcement of the 
blockade and the reduction of Confederate manufacturing, with the 
contingent impact of reduced supplies on the outcome of hostilities. 
But the taking of the Crescent City also opened up the Mississippi to 
attack and allowed the Union, once sufficient forces had been 
assembled under Nathaniel Banks, to penetrate deep into the 
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Confederate interior capturing Baton Rouge, another centre of 
manufacturing, and moving on towards Port Hudson and 
Vicksburg.10 It also had the effect of degrading the impact of the 
Confederacy’s holding onto Galveston, Texas since, though the port 
was open for blockade running and could thus accept war materials 
and export cotton, the supplies could not reach the main war 
theatres because coastal warfare had facilitated the severing of the 
transport links needed to convey the materials east.11 Thus, while 
the location of some Confederate ports on rivers protected them to 
a degree from the full enforcement of blockade by stopping Union 
ships moving in close, the rivers became a liability if the ports fell, 
since they offered highways for extending the attacks and 
consequent disruption.  
 
As well as offering the potential to exploit rivers to attack the 
Confederacy internally, land operations gave the Union the power to 
disrupt Southern communications in other ways. The railroads 
which served as the main means of north-south communication in 
the Confederacy’s Eastern states were just as important as the 
‘seam of the Confederacy,’ the Mississippi river, was to 
communications in the West. Cities such as New Bern, which 
possessed the junctions of two important railroads12 represented a 
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tantalizing prize for expansively minded Union officers since 
capturing the City and cutting the railroads there would result in not 
only the loss of a trading and manufacturing centre, but would 
create the need for a detour of hundreds of miles for supplies being 
transported to Lee’s army in Virginia. The severing of transport links 
also disrupted the movement of export products, mainly cotton, 
with which the South paid for its overseas purchases, to the coast 
for consignment in blockade runners.13 Furthermore, though their 
utility in this sense was never really exploited,14 command of the 
railroads opened up the possibility of more wide ranging penetrative 
strikes into the South’s vitals. Thus the use of land attacks went 
beyond simply reinforcing and tightening the naval blockade, albeit 
this on its own would have been a substantial contribution to the 
war’s outcome. The extension of the operations to include the 
disruption of internal communications could more actively assist the 
efforts of Northern field armies beyond a slow strangulation by 
blockade.    
 
As has been explored above, one of the reasons why the north was 
able to blockade the South with such comparative impunity was 
because the Confederate states began the war with practically no 
navy whatsoever. However, in Norfolk, Virginia lay the wreck of a 
modern, steam powered USN frigate, the Merrimac, which the Union 
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had been unable to extricate from the dockyard before it fell into 
the hands of Virginia secessionists and which the Northerners had 
thus burned to prevent its capture. The conflagration however had 
succeeded only in destroying the ship down to the waterline and on 
top of the remaining hull the Southerners constructed a sloping iron 
casemate, creating a large and powerful ironclad warship, 
possession of which the Confederate Navy Department considered 
to be a ‘matter of the first necessity.’15 Rechristened CSS Virginia 
she went on to become one of the most famous warships of the 
War, and represented a significant threat to the integrity of the 
Union blockade and attempts to capture Norfolk.  
 
The story of the creation of the Merrimac/Virginia, along with that of 
the CSS Albemarle touched upon in chapter one, is significant as it 
illustrates the way in which the South could convert or assemble 
ironclads as long as materials were available, and especially in the 
event that they had access to dockyard facilities. Of similar 
importance is the story of the destruction wrought on the Union 
fleet by the Virginia which, in a single afternoon in 1862 sank, 
grounded or burned three large Federal warships and struck terror 
into the broader Union. Particularly there was a fear that the ram 
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would steam up the Potomac and shell the White House.16 The 
ironclad presented a serious problem for the Union, since within its 
area of operation conventional blockading ships could not continue 
to work. The initial Union solution to the problem of Southern 
ironclads was the construction of an innovative and technically 
superior equivalent, the USS Monitor.17 But the climactic battle 
between the two advanced vessels merely illustrated the resilience 
of iron sheathed ships to gunfire attacks, the action ending in a 
dissatisfying draw.18 In the aftermath of the action, damage 
inflicted on the Virginia was repaired in the Confederate dock 
facilities on shore. As long as the port remained in Confederate 
hands the Virginia could continue to attack the blockaders, or duel 
again with the Monitor, retreating for repairs to the safety of the 
docks and the James and Elizabeth Rives. Even had the Monitor 
succeeded in destroying the Virginia there was still the prospect 
that the Southerners would construct another ironclad to replace it, 
and the drama would be repeated. The ultimate answer then was to 
occupy Norfolk, Gosport and the Navy Yard there by a land 
operation. This forced the Virginia to retire up the James River as 
far as her deep draft, a legacy of her origins as a frigate would 
allow. There, threatened with capture, she was blown up by the 
Confederates. 
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The story however did not end with the Virginia, as other 
Confederate ironclads where then under construction. In particular, 
a pair to be named Louisiana and Mississippi were being built at 
New Orleans whose large size and heavy armament would have 
rendered the City a far more difficult target for attack.19 This 
consideration was one of the reasons why the attack on New 
Orleans was advanced and why it was pressed home so strongly.20 
When the attack did go in the ironclads had not yet been completed 
and their only part in the battle was undertaken the CSS Louisiana, 
which operated as an ineffective floating battery during the attack. 
The naval attack, chastened by the signal success of the Virginia 
and the prospective appearance of the Louisiana and Mississippi, 
ultimately led to a land occupation of the Crescent City, which 
neutralised the ironclad problem in that quarter before it had 
matured into the significant threat it could have become. 
 
Thus, land operations were a crucial factor in the prevention of 
Confederate plans to break, or at least challenge, the blockade 
coming to fruition. The capture of ports robbed the Southern 
vessels of their homes and made them fugitives in the inland rivers 
as far as the individual ironclads’ construction would allow. The 
occupation of ports also had the by-product of preventing the 
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manufacture of more ironclads in those cities, or their 
manufacturing capacity being used to support the construction of 
ironclads elsewhere, as may have happened had the individual 
vessels been destroyed but their bases left unoccupied. The removal 
of the worst of the ironclad threat was one of the most obvious and 
tangible effects of coastal operations on the outcome of the War. 
The destruction of the Confederate’s ironclad vessels removed the 
only domestic possibility for breaking the Union blockade. The 
reinforcement of the blockade meant that enough overseas goods 
could not reach the South, and the prevention of further 
construction of Confederate vessels in key areas represented an 
important step toward the ultimate victory of Northern arms. 
 
Away from the battlefield, ship’s deck or factory floor, coastal land 
operations also influenced significantly the political sphere. Blockade 
was not publicly visible, nor was it dramatic enough to intrude 
broadly into the public consciousness, especially as it did not usually 
result in the extended casualty lists which a failed coastal land 
action could bring. The political dimension as it interacted with 
coastal warfare had important implications for both the North and 
the South. The chaotic Confederate congress, with no parties, and 
in which members occasionally physically attacked one another,21 
represented in many ways the nature of Southern politics. In 
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Richmond, every failure to maintain the integrity of its coast and 
every success in thwarting the Yankees caused already volatile 
Southern politics to see-saw between almost fulsome praise of the 
Confederate authorities, and bitter denunciations of generals, 
sailors and especially the Confederate president Jefferson Davis. 
Governors Zebulon Vance of North Carolina and Joseph Brown of 
Georgia, the latter joined by Davis’s own vice-president Alexander 
Stevens, in what was a fairly comprehensive betrayal of his office, 
became especially vociferous critics.22  Feeding the political fire was 
an often strident popular press. The South did not censor its press 
and newspapers enjoyed a freedom which seems amazing even in 
modern terms. As the War turned against the South, journalism 
became increasingly hostile. Southern papers editorialised viciously 
against the executive. A particular example was the Richmond 
Examiner whose associate editor, Edward A. Pollard, described as 
‘the sharpest pen in the journalistic South,’ nurtured an almost 
pathological hatred of the Confederate government in general and 
Davis in particular.23 This only served to reinforce the division within 
the South which hamstrung efforts to prosecute the War, and 
undermined the authority of the Southern government so that the 
States and their leaders became even less inclined to obey the 
political authorities’ instructions. 
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For the North the situation mirrored in some ways that in the South 
but also had some unique features. Newspapers in the North were 
as free as those in the Confederacy and there was a similar lack of 
obligation to the authorities. The New York Tribune, an influential 
paper run by the erratic Horace Greeley, enjoyed a wide readership 
and alternately praised and excoriated Lincoln and his policies, with 
Greeley on occasion taking it upon himself to counsel the president 
on matters of strategy.24 Additionally, opposition movements such 
as Clemet Vallandigham’s Copperheads, a pro-states’ rights 
movement, hostile to Lincoln on the grounds that the War was now 
being waged ‘for the negro,’25 gained support after every Union 
reverse. The military inertia which drove Vallandigham manifested 
itself in the political sphere when the now exiled Copperhead leader 
competed in the Ohio gubernatorial election on a ‘peace at any 
price’ ticket.26 Thus, from the perspective of Northern leaders, 
coastal operations were an attractive option since they promised 
cheap and potentially easy success, which could be held up as 
evidence that the North was winning the war. This was useful in 
counterbalancing negative opinion at times when the main land 
campaign had embarrassingly and damagingly stalled. 
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The significance of achieving success, no matter how small, was 
important to the North’s political administration because the Union 
would have to face a federal election in wartime. Public opinion was 
obviously heavily swayed by military events, and given how poorly 
Union armies were doing for much of the war; victories of any sort 
would be significant in terms of maintaining the Lincoln 
administration in power. This became even more acute later, as the 
Confederates 
 objectives changed after defeats Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Once 
the Confederacy had come to the realisation that outright victory 
was an impossibility, its strategy altered to one of the avoidance of 
defeat, with a view to protracting the War long enough that the will 
of the North to press the conflict until final victory failed, and a 
peace was made.27 The fate of Abraham Lincoln’s Republican 
administration was strongly bound up in this since the Democratic 
ticket in the 1864 presidential election, headed by George McLellan, 
the former commander of the Army of the Potomac, promised peace 
with the South if it was elected. The 1864 vote was thus, in effect, a 
referendum on the continuance of the War.28 While McLellan’s bid 
for the Presidency ultimately failed, the prospects in the run up to 
the vote looked bleak. Lincoln himself admitted the probability that 
his ‘administration would not be re-elected’ and that it would be his 
‘duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union 
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between the election and the inauguration.’29 Coastal land 
operations played a big role in giving the public hope that the 
conflict could be won in the immediate future. When the vote took 
place, loyalty on the part of Union soldiers to their former 
commander was outweighed by loyalty to their commander in chief, 
and the desire of veterans to see the war through to its close 
delivered the important army vote into Lincoln’s hands. But it was 
the twin military victories, inland at Atlanta and on the coast at 
Mobile Bay which gave the boost to civilian morale which allowed 
Lincoln to triumph.30 Therefore an operation targeting a 
Confederate coastal settlement had the direct effect of providing a 
bolster to the Lincoln Administration’s faltering chances of re-
election at a crucial moment, ensuring that there would be no peace 
until ultimate victory was secured for the Union. 
 
Thus, coastal land actions had the chief effects of reinforcing the all 
important blockade which, as we have seen exercised a 
considerable effect on the War’s outcome. Additionally, the North 
was presented with alternative opportunities for moving beyond 
blockade to affect the War’s outcome through coastal operations. In 
the event, this potential was never fully exploited, something which 
did not happen in large part due to the placing of a greater 
emphasis on the operations of the Union’s main field armies. Away 
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from purely military matters, the movements of land armies along 
the Confederate coast were important to the domestic political 
scene to a greater extent than mere blockade alone, due to their 
visibility and obvious war winning potential. By 1864 politics had 
become crucial to whether the war would result in Union victory or 
some sort of compromise peace in which Southern independence 
was recognised. Therefore, military actions which influenced the 
political scene were crucial to the outcome of hostilities.  
 
However, it was not just domestically that politics and the coastal 
war intersected. The presence of a blockade on the Southern 
seaboard and its impact on international trade presaged the impact 
of coastal war on the international scene, to which the foreign 
policies of the American belligerents would prove crucial, and in 
which the will of the European imperial giants would be of great 
importance. 
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~ 3. ~ 
~ Brother Jonathan, John Bull and King Cotton - the 
International Dimension ~ 
 
The third key area in which the coastal war was important in terms 
of the broader outcome of the American Civil War was in the way 
that coastal operations, again in particular the blockade, influenced 
the foreign relations of the belligerent powers. Foreign relations 
were of great significance to the Union and the Confederacy in a 
world where America was a small power, even if the size of its 
ambition exceeded its diminutive political stature. In 1861 the two 
powers with the most international importance were Britain and 
France.1 Though Britain was the stronger of the two powers, not 
least because of the power of her immense navy, she acted in 
concert with France when it came to relations with the US during 
the Civil War. Only five years before the outbreak of the American 
conflict, Britain and France had, in company with the Turks, waged 
war as allies against Russia in the Crimea, largely for the purposes 
of maintaining the geopolitical status quo to the detriment of 
Russian ambitions.2 This joint action by the two imperial European 
powers signified the unfortunate timing of the Civil War from the 
American, and especially Southern, perspective. Southern leaders 
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hoping to play one power off against the other and draw them into 
the war had launched their move at a time when the centuries-old 
rivalry between Britain and France had waned considerably. The 
lack of the possibility of unilateral action therefore had important 
implications for the prospects of the American belligerents’ foreign 
relations ambitions vis-à-vis the European powers. Just as France 
would not act without Britain due to a thawing of relations, so other 
European powers followed suit as a result of the tacit coercion 
offered by British and French power; Portugal, Spain and several 
South American nations declared neutrality policies at around the 
same time as Britain and France.3 Thus while Britain and France 
resolved to stay out of the conflict the South could not look 
elsewhere in Europe since the leaders of the other European states 
had too much to lose in the event that they antagonised the two 
giants.  
 
The geographical distance between Europe and America meant that 
the only way in which the European powers could physically interact 
with the American belligerents was in relation to the Northern 
blockade. In this sense the entire gamut of the foreign relations of 
the American combatants can be regarded as falling within the 
scope of coastal warfare. Blockade was, as we have seen, ultimately 
the most significant and crucial of the North’s war-making efforts. 
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The greater part of the North and the South’s foreign policy was 
aimed either at attaining or preventing the intervention of foreign 
powers whose involvement (or remaining aloof) would chiefly 
concern the continuation of the blockade or its elimination. Due to 
the fact that other coastal efforts on the part of the North stemmed 
from the blockade, the impact of foreign relations meant that the 
land operations mentioned in chapter two must also be considered 
in light of the importance of foreign relations. 
 
For the North therefore, foreign policy mainly intersected with 
coastal warfare in terms of its blockade. The significance of the 
blockade to the Union war effort meant that it played an important 
role in the success of the North’s campaign for victory. The blockade 
was important in international terms for two main reasons. The first 
of these was the legitimacy of the North’s action. President Lincoln 
was at all times careful never to refer to the South in any terms 
which might be interpreted as conferring nationhood upon the 
Confederate States. This was because in the event that the South 
did achieve internationally recognised statehood, certain conditions 
and rights would apply to it which did not prevail as long as the 
South represented merely ‘those states the people whereof shall 
then be in rebellion against the United States.’4 Chief among the 
new conditions which would entail upon the South achieving 
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statehood was that the Confederate vessels would be allowed 
greater freedom for them to victual and refit in foreign ports, as 
well as rendering Southern access to European built ships and 
supplies easier.5 As it was the Southern ensign was only ‘tolerated, 
not recognised’ in foreign seaports, and the way a Confederate 
vessel was treated depended very much on the individual 
sensibilities of the local authority.6 Though the South was never 
recognised officially, international law at the time held that a state 
could not blockade itself, this was an action reserved for use against 
other sovereign states. Therefore, in direct conflict with Lincoln’s 
repeated assertions that the Southerners were engaged in a mere 
rebellion, the employment of the blockade could be interpreted 
internationally as a tacit recognition of the South as a nation, 
conferring a ’quasi-nationhood’ on the Confederacy.7 In either case, 
since the European navies, whose power could easily crush the 
USN, were no friends of the Union they could be relied upon to lift 
the blockade, by force if necessary.  
 
The second intersection of coastal war and foreign relations was in 
the efforts of the North to prevent the Confederates, by fair means 
or foul, from obtaining war materials and other supplies in Europe 
which could be run through the blockade to help the South fight the 
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War or lift the blockade. The slow strangulation of the South by 
blockade was being impeded by the willingness of European, 
especially British and French, manufacturers to produce goods to 
order for the South, including substantial military products like 
guns, steam engines and even ships, and the enthusiasm of their 
citizens for attempting to run these supplies through the Northern 
cordon. The European built ships in particular were a worry to the 
North as they could be used to attack Northern commerce or even 
raise the blockade. It was in this arena that the South came most 
closely into contact with what James Bulloch described as ‘the most 
annoying foes we have to contend with on this side of the Atlantic.’8 
These enemies were the Proclamation of Neutrality and, 
particularly, the Foreign Enlistment Act. The latter prohibited British 
citizens from joining belligerent armies, but also made it illegal for 
Her Majesty’s subjects to build or equip a vessel for the service of a 
belligerent power.9 Ultimately, it was difficult to bring successful 
prosecutions under the Act, even when the British authorities were, 
in the opinion of the Confederates, favouring the Union.10 However, 
the North was able to instigate a number of investigations which 
encroached more and more on the Southerner’s ability to procure 
ships and other necessities in Britain.11  
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In the Confederate conception of foreign relations European powers, 
chiefly Britain and France would have a core role in the plan for 
achieving their independence.12 Southern leaders knew as well as 
their Northern counterparts what the impact of foreign recognition 
would be on the blockade. In this respect they believed that they 
had a significant advantage over the North in terms of forcing the 
compliance of European states to their will. The Confederate leaders 
believed that cotton would prove to be a secret weapon when 
dealing with Britain and France, in particular since those countries 
possessed significant cotton cloth manufacturing which would suffer 
in the event that cotton supplies were interrupted. This mentality, 
summed up in the Charleston Mercury’s comment that ‘the cards’ 
were in Confederate hands,13 led to a belief that pressure thus 
placed upon the governments in Britain and France would lead to 
them recognising and ultimately aiding the South.14 Obviously the 
coastal war was of huge significance to this because the use of 
cotton as a foreign policy weapon against Europe would depend on 
the ability of the South to conduct commerce along its coasts. In 
the event, cotton did not turn out to be the political weapon the 
South had imagined. The cotton situation was identified early on in 
Europe, and steps were taken to secure alternative supplies15 which 
would remove the need to treat with the South, and the relationship 
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between cotton and recognition was not as powerful as had initially 
been thought.16 Unfortunately for the South, by the time this had 
been realised the blockade was sufficiently tight that large 
quantities of cotton could not be used, even in the secondary role of 
generating funds for the South to buy arms and ships in Europe (a 
suggestion which had been rejected in 1861.)17 It was too late. 
Foreign leaders were obviously not being held to ransom by the 
South, their people were being inconvenienced by the actions of the 
North. 
 
This distinction was important because, despite victories in the early 
part of the war impressive enough to lead British politician William 
Ewart Gladstone to remark, to an audience in Newcastle, that the 
South had ‘built a nation,’18 the South was, undeniably, the 
underdog. The Union was the overwhelming favourite by dint of its 
massive preponderance in resources and men. Measures such as 
emancipation, though initially regarded as a cynical ‘last card’ 
played by a desperate Northern government,19 eventually combined 
with the reverses suffered by Confederate arms, amongst them 
coastal defeats, to cause Confederate stock in England to fall to an 
ever lower ebb. The result of this was that, though the North’s 
blockade was cutting the supply of cotton to Europe, to a degree 
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sufficient to result in major consequences for some members of the 
industrial population of Britain and France,20 the North was 
reinforced as the side for the Europeans to back because they were 
obviously the most likely to win. Therefore, ignoring Confederate 
overtures and taking action to prevent Confederate agents 
operating to purchase war materials would bring about a Northern 
victory sooner, restoring the supplies of cotton which the blockade 
was curtailing, while a Northern victory would also further the anti-
slavery objectives of British and French statesmen. 
 
Gaining the full benefit of the broadly pro-Northern sentiments of 
European leaders, especially those in Britain, hinged on the Union 
doing nothing to unnecessarily antagonise Europe into modifying 
this view. The commitment of the Union’s leaders to avoiding this 
was evidenced by the fact that they were prepared to ignore 
affronts to Northern dignity and international stature for the sake of 
keeping Britain and France firmly out of the conflict. Lincoln’s ‘one 
war at a time’ policy towards Britain went against the public 
sensibilities of his powerful Secretary of State William H. Seward. 
Seward had been one of Lincoln’s challengers for the republican 
Presidential nomination and even after his defeat those around him 
nurtured ambitions of Seward’s playing the power behind the Union 
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throne.21 Seward himself at least assumed he would have a far 
greater authority in cabinet than Lincoln would actually allow him.22 
During the secession crisis and the early part of the War, it was 
Seward’s belief that the prospect of hostilities with Britain would 
induce the seceded states to rejoin the Union in order to combat the 
common enemy. Aggressive rhetoric would also play well in regard 
of longstanding American ambitions, such as the one expressed by 
Seward himself, that Canada was destined for membership of the 
Union.23 Furthermore, war with Britain was viewed as extremely 
desirable by the broader Northern population and moments of 
tension with Britain during the War produced an initial clamour 
among the Union’s citizens which was again ignored by Lincoln 
despite his later admission to Grant that the ultimate release of the 
captured commissioners was a ‘bitter pill to swallow.’24 The fact that 
Lincoln was prepared to override Seward, particularly considering 
the significant political backing he brought to the administration, as 
well as the popular will of his own people, indicates how seriously 
the Northern president took foreign relations and to what extent he 
viewed them as being crucial to Union victory.  
 
While Britain represented a nation against whom war was a popular 
prospect, both for a number of the politicians and many of the 
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people, a conflict with France was less favoured. France was of 
course the power who had made victory possible for the Americans 
in the Revolutionary War. But France was also more sympathetic to 
the Southern cause than Britain, proposing at one point simply to 
ignore the blockade and trade with the Confederacy. Only the 
reluctance of Britain prevented this since the French refused to act 
unilaterally.25 Yet the French were also providing affronts to the 
United States by their citizens engaging in the construction and 
supply of war materials to the South, significantly ironclads, and 
through their intervention in Mexico. The French attempt to support 
their favoured Emperor Maximilian on the Mexican throne was a 
clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine and in normal circumstances 
would not have been tolerated.26 It also had consequences for 
coastal warfare as the turmoil in Mexico allowed the Confederates to 
land some of their imports in that country and smuggle them across 
the border into Texas and thence to points where they were needed 
in the South.27 Ordinarily the United States would have taken action 
to prevent this, even potentially to the extent of using quasi-legal or 
illegal means to do so, such as invading Mexican territorial waters. 
Indeed, during the war the Union Navy did violate the territorial 
waters of another foreign state, that of Brazil, when a USN warship 
sailed into the harbour of Bahia in order to destroy a Confederate 
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commerce raider, the Florida, which was hiding there.28 However, 
the presence of the French in Mexico meant that the Union could 
not take the comprehensive measures used elsewhere, out of a 
desire to avoid giving the French cause to intervene in the Civil 
War, and the trickle of supplies through Mexico continued. The 
Union was again prepared to ignore affronts to its international 
dignity. This included encroachments on the cherished Monroe 
Doctrine. The fifth President’s proclamation held much sway with 
American voters, even if it had been a somewhat optimistic decree 
given that the relative stature of the United States vs. the European 
giants meant that it often fell to the British to de facto enforce it.29  
 
Similarly the depredations of confederate cruisers were largely 
ignored. Though the careers of the Confederate commerce raiding 
vessels such as the Florida, Alabama and Shenandoah lie somewhat 
outside the scope of coastal warfare (even if some of them had at 
times to run into or out of Southern ports thus coming into contact 
with the blockading fleets) their impact on the freedom enjoyed by 
Union trade was marked. Their effectiveness in driving the North’s 
merchant ensign from the seas entailed a significant financial cost 
for the North.30 Yet aside from loud protests little was done by the 
Union in an aggressive fashion to deal with the cruisers, highlighting 
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both the importance of the blockade in soaking up USN vessels 
which might otherwise have been used to track down the raiders, 
and also the degree to which pacific foreign relations with Europe 
were placed above individual incidents. That the actions of the 
cruisers were of concern to the North, was illustrated by the post-
war ‘Alabama Claims’ case. This took the form of extended legal 
wrangling which eventually produced a considerable cash 
settlement extending into millions of dollars for the North from 
Britain in consideration of her role in the production of the Southern 
cruisers.31 The Alabama Claims were worth a total of £15.5 million 
to the United States. The fact that the US was prepared to wait until 
after the war to recoup so significant an amount illustrates the 
degree to which Northern leaders recognised that foreign relations 
were important inasmuch as their military operations, and in 
particular their blockade, could not continue if an antagonistic policy 
resulted in European intervention. 
  
Other diplomatic efforts on the part of the North were directed at 
the prevention of foreign individuals from manufacturing for the 
Confederates supplies of war materials. In terms of coastal war we 
have already discussed the question of the supply of building 
materials, especially marine steam engines, from Europe. However, 
the actions taken by North and South in relation to the production 
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of whole ships for the Confederacy are also of a particular 
significance. Southern agents, prominent amongst them James 
Bulloch in England, operated to procure vessels for the purposes of 
raiding Union commercial shipping in the Atlantic and Pacific and, 
importantly, for actively challenging the blockade.32 The significance 
of this to coastal operations and the outcome of the war are 
obvious. Though notable, the actions of the CSS Virginia, mentioned 
earlier, were limited in their success by the ironclad’s makeshift 
construction and a design which prevented it from being able to 
operate outside the confines of Hampton Roads and the lower 
James and Elizabeth Rivers. In prospect in Britain and France were 
truly formidable, ocean-going ships which would have joined the 
ranks of the world’s most powerful naval vessels. These were not 
mere raiders designed for commerce destroying such as the much 
famed CSS Alabama, they were warships, with the power to 
‘entirely destroy the blockading vessels.’33 They would be armed 
with the best weapons and equipment available and would not have 
been hindered by the problems which afflicted the domestically 
constructed Confederate ships such as inadequate engines. By 
crippling the Union coastal thrust they would open the South to a 
renewed flow of European finished goods essential for the 
Confederate war effort. Using the vessels to hold Northern ports to 
ransom, therefore targeting the North’s war economy directly, was 
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also envisioned.34 In light of this, the pursuance of foreign relations 
which would bring about a solution to the problem in favour of one 
or other of the belligerents became important to the outcome of the 
war. Should the ironclad warships, under construction at Lairds on 
the Mersey in England, and in France, be released onto the oceans 
they would represent a significant factor in favour of the South, 
since the North had no effective answer then afloat or on land.35 
 
As well as the direct intersection between overseas policy and 
coastal warfare, for the Confederates to carry on foreign relations at 
all it would require that the blockade was not made airtight. Before 
boarding the Trent, the Confederate commissioners had exited the 
South via a blockade runner as far as Nassau. The international 
incident the US navy precipitated by boarding the British mail 
steamer, in order to capture the two Southerners, would not have 
happened if Mason and Slidell had been marooned in the South by 
blockade. Though the Commissioners eventually did reach their 
destinations, largely due to Lincoln and Seward’s moves not to 
provoke foreign intervention,36 no more could be sent if the 
blockade could not be penetrated. With a key part of Southern 
strategy being based on attaining foreign support, difficulty in 
sending diplomats to Europe or anywhere else was obviously going 
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to frustrate those ambitions as much as political efforts, on the part 
of the North, such as emancipation, would. Furthermore, the action 
of the blockade prevented the timely arrival of diplomatic 
correspondence with the result that messages from the confederate 
government to its commissioners and vice-versa were delayed for 
months. Consequently the effectiveness of the South’s diplomacy 
was curtailed by a lack of up to date knowledge of events in Europe, 
as well as by an inability to instruct its representatives in how to act 
to the best effect when the facts eventually became known. Even 
worse, the backlogs meant that when mail and despatches could be 
found a berth on a blockade runner, they were collected together in 
quantity, with the consequence that if the ship were captured 
volumes of secret and damaging documents would fall into Federal 
hands.37 This situation, another function of the coastal war, led to 
the unmasking of well placed Confederate agents and derailed the 
Confederacy’s long term plans for the acquisition of war materials in 
Britain and France. This situation contrasted with that of the Union 
which had essentially unrestricted diplomatic access to its agents in 
Europe including its resident ministers such as Charles Francis 
Adams, who could use regular diplomatic channels to communicate 
the North’s position to European leaders.38 Had the Confederate 
cruisers become more numerous or powerful, or the British and 
French built ironclads been released, it may have become unsafe to 
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consign diplomatic correspondence in American ships. But the Union 
had access to the British and French ministers in Washington, Lord 
Lyons and Mr. Henri Mercier respectively, who could be used as 
intermediaries between the Union leadership and the European 
governments.39 The consequence was that while the South’s ability 
to communicate with its only semi-recognised diplomats was 
curtailed by the blockade, the North, with no such barrier and with 
its blockade significantly reducing the risk that the Confederates 
would be able to interrupt communications, was in a much superior 
position to conduct diplomacy to the detriment of the South’s aims. 
 
Similarly, the network of Confederate purchasing agents in Europe 
was crucial to the South’s desire to obtain quantities of foreign 
goods which were difficult, or impossible to manufacture in the 
Confederacy. Without their own agents in position across the 
Atlantic there could be no arranging of shipments to be carried by 
blockade runners or any other means. Once in place the 
Confederate agents could not easily be sent assistance or further 
supplies of currency with which to conduct their transactions as long 
as the blockade was in force. By November 1862 the Confederate 
procurement efforts had been existing on credit for months, and 
threats that the debts would be called in were beginning to 
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mount.40 Consequently, since so many Southern hopes rested on 
securing foreign goods and foreign support the presence of the 
Northern blockade frustrated their efforts to achieve either or both. 
Confederate agents in Europe were prevented from forwarding their 
goods to the South, but those agents were also prevented even 
from reaching Europe.  
 
Ultimately the Confederate diplomatic offensive was reduced to a 
handful of Commissioners whose influence was limited, and who 
became increasingly hard for the South to contact with instructions 
as to how to proceed. Therefore efforts on the part of the Northern 
government in pressuring foreign administrations into enforcing 
provisions such as the Foreign Enlistment Act and avoiding, even at 
a political cost to themselves, antagonising European governments 
into open hostilities, allowed the Union to hurt its Southern 
opponents in a war winning fashion without massive expenditure.  
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~ ‘Laying Siege to Land-Power’ ~ 
 
British geographer and geostrategist Sir Halford Mackinder once 
commented that ‘sea-power has been laying siege to land-power.’1 
Though Mackinder was commenting on a different war, the literal 
meaning of this phrase is applicable to coastal operations during the 
American Civil War. In the same way that a siege brings about a 
decision by weakening the capacity for resistance of the garrison 
until either a capitulation ensues or the storming of the enemy 
ramparts is possible, so the North’s coastal efforts served this same 
weakening role. This is not to ignore the rest of the North’s efforts. 
Had not the great field armies of the Union fought and overcome 
their opponents in grey to occupy the Confederate Capital and other 
key points such as Vicksburg and Atlanta then the final victory of 
the Union would not have taken place when or where it did, or at 
all.  
 
It is undeniable that some of the depreciation in the effectiveness of 
Confederate field armies was due to causes outside the influence of 
blockade, the capture of Southern ports or the best efforts of 
Northern diplomacy. The massive losses suffered by Confederate 
forces meant that the quality of the troops gradually declined as the 
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ranks were replenished progressively with ever older, and especially 
younger, recruits with Jefferson Davis lamenting that the use of the 
latter was tantamount to ‘grinding the seed-corn of the Republic.’2 
The loss of able commanders such as the famous ‘Stonewall’ 
Jackson also played a part which could not be influenced by the 
Union Navy. That said the Confederate army operated in the 
presence of handicaps which can be traced directly to the effects of 
coastal war. The South was, for a start, an unstable organisation 
politically and militarily. This was an inevitable function both of the 
Confederacy’s nature, and of the extreme youth of the Southern 
Nation. In a situation where the North was waging war against a 
dysfunctional opponent, any efforts which served to increase the 
instability would materially affect the outcome. In this sense the 
blockade, which targeted equally the Confederate home front as 
well as the military, added to the internal conflict. The costal 
operations on land deepened this, physically by cutting transport 
and communications links such as railways, and psychologically by 
brutally reminding Southerners that they were not safe even in their 
own homeland, far from the main fighting in Virginia, Tennessee or 
Georgia.3 
 
In this way the impact of the war was brought to the whole of the 
Confederate nation. Those on the coast and within easy distance of 
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it might suffer directly, but those far inland suffered also as 
everyday commodities became ever rarer, money depreciated ever 
further and life became increasingly hard and miserable. This 
impact on the Confederate home front was dealt out largely through 
coastal war. Union land armies had not penetrated deep into the 
South, especially in the East until the middle of the War’s 
penultimate year. It represented also an important factor in 
hastening the collapse of the South’s field armies; especially Lee’s 
Army of Northern Virginia, probably the South’s most important. 
After the failure of the Confederate attack at Sayler’s Creek two 
days before his final meeting with Grant at the Wilmer MacLean 
house in Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, Lee asked an officer 
‘what would the Nation think’ of him if surrendered.4 The reply 
illustrates succinctly the way in which the fortunes of the unstable 
Nation had been subsumed by those of the army, to the extent that 
the collapse of one would mean the collapse of the other. The aide 
replied ‘the Nation be damned, there is no Nation, there has been 
none for a year or more, you are the Nation to these men.’5 
 
The deterioration of the Nation, as influenced by coastal war was 
therefore mirrored in a deterioration of the armed forces and a 
deterioration of the armed forces entailed a concomitant effect on 
the populace. The Confederate States army had always, as we have 
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seen, laboured at a disadvantage in terms of manpower and 
materiel and the fact that the South was never able to remedy the 
latter situation was a major function of coastal war. In particular 
after 1863, as the South began everywhere to fight on the 
defensive for strictly limited objectives, her armies could no longer 
replenish their stocks from captured Union supplies as they had 
done in the past.6 This in turn exposed the gaping hole in the 
Confederate provisioning system brought about by the blockade and 
the capture of the South’s port-based manufacturing. Not only was 
the Confederacy incapable of providing weapons such as rifles and 
cannon, it could not even supply the basic necessities as evinced by 
shoeless Confederate soldiers limping back from defeat at Nashville 
in the middle of a bitter winter, starving and clad in rags. Not only 
did this depreciate the fighting effectiveness of the Confederate 
soldier it also, understandably, significantly reduced the incentive to 
remain with the colours in a way which even the threat of death 
could not prevent. Desertion, traceable to coastal warfare both 
through its effect on the fighting man himself and his family and 
dependents, eroded the ability of the South’s field armies as surely 
as the lack of a rifle or ammunition to fight with.  
 
If the South could not supply itself and was relying on an at best 
creaking and, at worst, hostile administration and populace to 
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support its war effort then it had to look elsewhere for solutions. In 
this way the South turned to foreign countries to supply its 
deficiencies. In this respect the foreign policies of the North and the 
South impacted upon the outcome of hostilities. Much of the 
intercourse between the Union and the European giants, Britain and 
France, was concerned with coastal efforts. Focussing particularly 
on the blockade, the Confederacy also sought, by placing agents in 
Britain and France to ameliorate the South’s deficiency in 
shipbuilding by contracting with British and French yards to build 
warships. That the North regarded this as important is shown in the 
way that Lincoln and his inner circle were prepared to put on one 
side what, as they saw it, were the both overt, and tacit, 
depredations of the European Great Powers. The fact that the North 
was ignoring affronts on purpose and that those affronts were of 
significance is illustrated by the steps taken by the United States to 
gain satisfaction from Britain in the aftermath of the war through 
the ‘Alabama Claims.’ It is not the case that the North was simply 
unconcerned by the actions of Britain in this regard, rather the 
Northern leadership was pragmatically ignoring the issue. If that 
were that not the case her leaders would hardly have gone to the 
great lengths they did to bring about an arbitration in Geneva on 
the subject of the reparations to be paid by Britain for her supposed 
primary role in birthing the Confederate raider Alabama, amongst 
others, which so terrorised Union shipping during the Civil War. The 
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South’s foreign policy in respect of Britain and France was also tied 
up with coastal war in that, the South was seeking European help in 
removing the strangling effect of the blockade.  
 
Beyond this their policy was directed at using European industry to 
fulfil the wants of their armed forces and people, who were being 
starved of necessities not only due to the blockade, but because of 
the South’s inferiority in industry on which the blockade capitalised. 
The disappointment of the South in this, as shown in Jefferson 
Davis’s exasperated 1863 exhortation to his citizens to ‘put not your 
trust in princes and rest not your hopes on foreign nations,’7 
represented a significant boost to the North’s coastal effort since 
the blockaders, ever tightening their stranglehold, now knew that 
they could do so without the fear of molestation by the European 
navies. The failure of Confederate foreign policy meant there would 
be no danger that warships of irresistible power would be unleashed 
on the Union fleet. Underpinning this was the fact that the North 
had ensured that legislation including the Foreign Enlistment Act 
was enforced, which had resulted in the confiscation of the 
formidable ‘Laird Rams,’ while a similar process in France had 
resulted in a torrid early career for the only European built ironclad 
actually commissioned, the CSS Stonewall, which resulted 
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ultimately in that ship only approaching the South after the war was 
over.     
 
While foreign policy starved the Confederacy of a chance to strike 
back at the blockade through the medium of formidable European 
built warships the twin effects of blockade and costal land actions 
steadily eroded the capacity of the South to produce home grown 
weapons for use against the blockaders. The South could, as 
mentioned above, produce ironclad vessels with the capacity to 
frighten to the extent of panic Northern leaders. But they could also 
genuinely provide a challenge to the Union blockading efforts which 
the USN would not be able to resist. By restricting the supply of 
materials which would be needed to construct sufficient ironclads to 
lift the blockade, either through preventing them from being 
brought in from abroad or being manufactured in the South by the 
capture of industrial ports, the coastal effort reinforced itself.   
 
Coastal warfare’s crucial impact on the outcome of the American 
Civil War can therefore be best expressed in terms of the ways it 
facilitated the victory of the North by weakening the South. Indeed, 
for long periods of the war, coastal warfare represented the only 
way in which the Union was able to conduct active operations 
against the Confederacy. The cumulative effects of coastal 
operations both indirectly and directly attacked the South, the 
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Union effort being constant and thus maintaining pressure on an 
opponent which was liable to crumble if heavily pressed. Blockade 
cut off the flow of supplies from abroad starving the home front and 
the army, while land actions, including the capture of port cities, 
reduced the South’s manufacturing capacity. In this way the Union 
effort on the Confederate coast reinforced itself by curtailing the 
ability of the South to take steps to lift the blockade or defend its 
ports, while the foreign relations offensives of the North completed 
the process by preventing the South circumventing these 
constraints by using contacts abroad. Land operations also 
disrupted the South’s internal communications and opened the way 
for penetrations deep into the Confederate hinterland, especially 
along the Mississippi river. Coastal operations also directly impacted 
the political conduct of the war providing popular support for the 
government when flagging morale looked like it would bring down 
the Lincoln administration and with it the Union’s chances of 
complete victory.  
 
The brief hints of victory elicited from the South’s efforts along its 
coast, such as the actions of the Virginia in Hampton Roads, were 
soon tempered by disappointment as the South was given example 
after example of how powerless it was to defend crucial coastal 
areas. The political impact of repeated defeats compounded the 
damage done to Confederate morale both on the front lines and on 
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the home front and combined with the success of the North’s field 
armies inland. Thus, the coastal war had an unmistakable role in 
facilitating the success of those armies, helping to produce the 
conditions in which the North eventually was able to achieve 
consistent victory. It also had a noticeable, though admittedly less 
far reaching, direct influence on the outcome of hostilities, ranging 
beyond the indirect facilitation offered by the strangling effect of 
blockade, the destabilising political influence domestically and the 
closing of the doors of foreign leaders to Southern envoys. In this 
sense the coastal effort can be viewed as crucial to the outcome of 
the War.
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Table 1 
Map 1 
Comparative 
manpower and 
material resources. 
Of particular note is 
the disparity in the 
manufacturing 
sector 
The mouth of the Cape Fear 
River and the forts which 
guarded the access to 
Wilmington, North Carolina, a 
major blockade running hub  
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Map 2 
Map 3 
The lower Mississippi and Red Rivers. Northern penetration of the 
waterways was facilitated by the capture of New Orleans 
Fort Pulaski on Cockspur Island, the ‘cork’ at the mouth of the Savannah 
River 
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Map 4 
The Southern railroad network. Notice the intersections of multiple lines in 
coastal settlements. 
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